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Great Fires: 1906 Great Earthquake & Fire

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Appendix A.
Earthquake in California, April 18, 1906
Special Report of Maj. Gen. Adolphus W. Greely, U. S. A., Commanding the Pacific Division

of the components of the ration or of the relief clothing. At the earliest possible moment three more commissary depots were established, and later two clothing depots, where room and opportunity for segregation and regular issues were possible.

The most difficult problem, however, was that of local transportation, the entire system of street railways being entirely interrupted, teams scarce, and most streets impassable, so that floats, boats, pack trains, etc., had to be utilized.

The demands of the army work alone necessitated two extensive corrals, where the quartermaster's teams during the greatest emergency numbered 228. When the civilian system of relief transportation was taken over by the army it necessitated an enormous increase of teaming, under very difficult conditions, between the central depots and the distributing supply stations. This most important duty was intrusted by Major Devol to Capt. Peter Murray, who found, on assuming charge May 2, no less than 557 hired teams engaged in transportation. By skillful planning and personal attention Captain Murray within forty-eight hours reduced the number of teams engaged in this work to 109 hired teams, at a cost of $918 per day, assisted by 30 Government teams, making 139 in all. This rearrangement, assuming rates of pay by the quartermaster and the city to be the same, made a saving of $3,519 per day for the 418 teams laid off.

Nor was the safe transfer of these stores through San Francisco and their delivery in bulk at the storehouse a question readily solved. Under the previous supply system robbery and diversion were rife. Stores were issued by the wagonload, and drivers bringing only three or four packages demanded and obtained receipt for an entire load. It is needless to dwell upon this unpleasant phase of relief work. There was but one remedy, which could not be applied until additional officers and men reached San Francisco. Then every wagonload was guarded by an armed soldier, who was responsible for the safe delivery of the stores as they left the depot. The most extensive looting of relief cars occurred in the yards of the Southern Pacific Railway. In their vicinity were large numbers of destitutes who acted on the principle that these being stores for the public needs, every man had a right to take what he could. It was not until the arrival of the 1st Cavalry that it was possible to safeguard all carload lots. Each and every case of looting reported to these headquarters in writing was made the subject of an investigation. It is to be said that in connection with the looting of supplies the officials of both the Southern Pacific and Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe railways invariably cooperated with the military authorities in determining the facts and in the use of deterrent measures. It may be added that the opinion toward the relief stores on the part of the large number of destitutes, though not of the whole, was to the effect that the supplies were given to the citizens of San Francisco. In consequence thousands acted upon the assumption that each man had a right to get his own without intervention of any relief organization. The fact that there were 60,000 refugees in Oakland and 10,000 more suffering from the earthquake disaster, from San Jose on the south to Santa Rosa on the north, did not appeal to the general mass of destitutes in this city. Naturally this view was not held by the officials responsible to the country for the proper management of affairs.

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The quantities of stores handled by Major Devol in the four weeks beginning April 18 was enormous. They covered the receiving, unloading, transportation, and storage of the contents of 1,331 cars, aggregating approximately 26,620 tons, and of 20 steamers with approximately 5,700 tons, making an average of 1,154 tons a day. Considering the conditions under which this work was done, it was a wonderful feat in transportation. To July 20 the freight aggregated 1,702 carloads.

Among other economies of the relief fund carried out by Major Devol is the storage of supplies on the transports Crook, Warren, and Buford. At a critical period when railway congestion threatened I assumed the responsibility of ordering their use for such purposes with the resultant saving to the relief fund of $3,000, which the storage charges would have amounted to.

Major Devol contributed very materially to the efficiency of the Red Cross work through the purchase under short time proposals for clothing and other urgently needed supplies. Through his well-trained corps of inspectors much work was done which resulted in insuring the delivery of goods to the Red Cross conforming in material to the special occasions.

The special mention here of any officer among the seventeen subordinates of Major Devol would be invidious, each having rendered most zealous and efficient services.


Large quantities of new army clothing were issued to the destitute in the early days of the disaster, but the unwisdom and extravagance of general issues were immediately recognized and their discontinuance ordered. It was apparent that the issue of food and the providing of shelter were all-important problems at first, as the mildness of the climate did not demand much additional apparel to that ordinarily worn. As has been before stated, the most pressing need of clothing was met by the army by issuing while the fire was in progress large numbers of shoes, shirts, ponchos, etc., which was done at the Presidio with utmost promptness. The first great distress over, attention was turned to the regular means of provision and issue. Believing that such work pertained to the Red Cross organization rather than to the army, I so advised Dr. E. T. Devine. At his urgent request, however, I consented to organize a special depot for clothing and household supplies, which was to be administered at the expense of the army and under the control of an officer. It was clearly understood, however, that the functions of the army should not include the designation of the persons to whom clothing was to be issued, nor the actual issues to applicants. The army was to receive and verify the shipments, segregate and arrange them, and be responsible for their transmission in bulk both from the railway to the depot and from the depot to the issuing stations, and also fill all requisitions filed by authorized agents of the Red Cross. Save in a very few instances in the great distress of the early days, no issues were made on the approval of an officer of the army. In short, the army did all the work except that of actually designating the person and passing the clothing to him.

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The work of distributing clothes to 200,000 homeless people was one of such magnitude that with a small force of volunteers and an enormous number of destitute applicants speedy and satisfactory action was impossible. After a conference between us, Doctor Devine decided to stop all issues until the enormous quantities of clothing on hand could be unpacked and arranged. This great work was undertaken by Capt. J. J. Bradley, 14th Infantry, the warehouse selected being the Crocker School, on Page street. This building was soon filled to overflowing, and it became necessary to establish a second warehouse where second-hand clothing, which had been received in large quantities, could be similarly arranged for distribution. The depot containing the second-hand clothing was organized in the Everett School under charge of Capt. Robert Field. Doctor Devine's agents took in hand the duty of clothing distribution, there being placed at each camp a suitable Red Cross agent who determined the meritorious cases, eliminated the impostors, and made the issues. These depots were so admirably managed by the army as to elicit the special commendation of Doctor Devine, who agreed with me that they facilitated, to the greatest possible extent, the prompt and economical distribution of clothing to the thousands of distressed applicants.

The utmost vigilance was necessary on the part of Captain Bradley to prevent thefts, and the same method was followed here as with subsistence supplies—that is, every load of clothing was guarded to its destination by an armed soldier, who was responsible for the safe delivery of the article listed. While all Red Cross requisitions filled by Capt. J. J. Bradley seem to amount to enormous numbers, yet in reality they are astonishing by the small amount of stores issued. For instance, the total amount of underwear for men, women, and children aggregated only 74,278 shirts, 82,923 drawers, and 128,972 socks, and there were issued 70,127 pairs of shoes and 85,580 blankets. It thus appears that the 200,000 homeless people must have been largely clothed elsewhere than from these supplies. As elsewhere stated, however, 40,173 pairs of shoes were issued by the army at the Presidio. Of course, large numbers of destitutes were clothed in Oakland, Berkeley, and elsewhere.

In general it may be said that the small demands for clothing emphasize the resourcefulness of San Franciscans. However, it is to be understood that very large quantities of clothing were issued through private charities. Mr. Raphael Weill, for instance, gave away to destitute women 5,000 complete suits, but as this subject pertains especially to Red Cross work it is not further considered.


Under the supervision of Lieut. Col. John A. Lundeen, inspector-general, a most efficient system of inspection was organized on April 22, which kept me fully informed as to the progress of events in San Francisco, furnished data for improvements of methods, and enabled the correction of abuses and neglects of various kinds. To this important service were assigned officers of rank, experience, and discretion. The officers serving on this duty were Col. Sedgwick Pratt, Artillery Corps; Lieut. Col. A. C. Sharpe, 30th Infantry; Lieut. Col. W. L. Pitcher, 28th Infantry; Lieut. Col. G. K. McGunnegle, 17th

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Infantry; Lieut. Col. J. P. Wisser, Inspector-General's Department; Lieut. Col. Lea Febiger, Inspector-General's Department; Maj. E. W. Howe, 27th Infantry; Maj. H. B. Moon, 10th Infantry, and Maj. O. M. Lissak, Ordnance Department. Each officer was assigned a special district over which he rode daily, keeping under his observation all matters which could effect the public order, the health of the city, the correction of abuses, and especially the relief of the destitute. They used my authority whenever cases of extreme destitution were brought to their attention, and immediately remedied such situations by orders for food, clothing, medicine, or shelter. These officers at 5 p. m. daily reported their observations, there being present at the conference General Funston, Major Devol, Major Krauthoff, Doctor Devereux, Colonel Jocelyn, Captain Haan, Major Dunning, and, when occasion required, Colonel Heuer. The entire situation was daily known by every officer charged with important duties.

To this system of inspection and the daily reports and conferences I attribute the satisfactory control of the many problems of local and current importance. The acuteness of observation, soundness of judgment, and pertinency of suggestions on the part of these officers were frequently noted by me. They played a most important part in the accomplishment of the great relief work undertaken by the army.

It may be added that the very harmonious work of these officers was most gratifying, especially in view of the fact that Colonels Pitcher, Sharpe, Pratt, and McGunnegle were all senior to Lieutenant-Colonel Lundeen, the inspector of the division. This is another indication of the willingness in emergencies of typical officers of high rank to take up duties of great public importance without advancing technicalities.


For prompt and efficient relief work means of communication by telegraph and telephone were necessary. The earthquake practically destroyed all lines of information within the limits of San Francisco, every office of the Western Union, Postal Telegraph, and Commercial Pacific Cable companies being interrupted. The Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company was rendered practically useless, few lines remaining and those in operation for a few hours only. Neither the Presidio nor Fort Mason, both within the limits of the city, could be reached by telephone or telegraph after the earthquake. In short, the city of San Francisco had reverted to the ante-telegraphic period. Until noon of the 18th a Postal Telegraph wire worked intermittently. From about 2.30 p. m., April 18, until 8.30 a. m. of the 19th there was no wire working out of the city. From 8.30 a. m. Thursday, the 19th, until Friday noon, one wire, that of the Southern Pacific Company at the ferry, handled by Mr. Le Coats, afforded the only telegraphic communication with the outside world.

Fortunately the Signal Corps of the Army was amply provided with field material. Under the personal supervision and direction of Capt. Leonard D. Wildman, Signal Corps, whose most efficient services are especially mentioned by General Funston, such speedy action was taken as established a military telegraph line between the Presidio of San Francisco and the outskirts of the fire, where an office was established by 10 a. m. of April 18 at Haight and Market streets.

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From that time General Funston remained in telegraphic communication with the Presidio, Fort Mason, Fort Baker, and Fort Miley, and next morning with the Southern Pacific Company's office at the ferry. Interruptions by fire and otherwise occurred to the Signal Corps lines, but by unremitting efforts they were of short duration. By the aid of the operators, instruments, and material of the Signal Corps the Western Union Company was enabled to open a city office on April 20 and the Postal Company on the 21st. The Commercial Pacific Cable system was restored on April 23.

The entire system of local communication in the burned district was dependent on the military telegraphic lines until May 10. Captain Wildman established a military system of 42 telegraph offices and 79 telephone offices, which connected with all the military districts, the Federal buildings, the railroad freight offices and depots, the offices of the Mayor and Governor, and other important points. While no service can be called indispensable by itself, yet it may be said that the efficient transaction of most urgent public business, the relief of extreme destitution, and other remedial measures in San Francisco were made promptly possible through the system of military telegraph and telephone lines thus installed and maintained. The volume of business may be judged from the fact that a thousand messages a day were handled, many of great length. It was not alone the number of messages, but the saving of time which facilitated enormously the extended work in hand.

From personal observations, the division commander confirms the statement that Captain Wildman's services were of special if not extreme value.


These duties were first intrusted to Lieut. Col. George H. Torney, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A., who, in addition to his special work in command of the Army General Hospital at the Presidio, was serving as chief surgeon, Department of California.

The magnificent and well-equipped General Hospital was left by the earthquake with disabled power plant, deprived of its water supply, without telegraphic or telephonic connections, and its buildings more or less injured. These adverse home conditions did not prevent prompt medical relief. On the first day 127 city patients were admitted to the hospital, followed the next day by 145 others from hospitals burned or threatened. When the capacity of the wards was exhausted, the Hospital Corps barracks were vacated and fitted up for relief work temporarily. In addition, large numbers of refugee patients were received at the hospitals of the Presidio and Fort Mason, and other facilities were extended through tent emergency hospitals. On the arrival of Company A, Hospital Corps, a field hospital was established in Golden Gate Park to care for the sick among the thousands of refugees there having temporary shelter.

On April 20 Colonel Torney's cooperation with the civil authorities commenced at the request of Dr. J. W. Ward, president of the health commission of San Francisco. It was fortunate that an officer of Colonel Torney's ability and professional attainments was available for this work, which has been performed in an able manner. He acted as head of a committee appointed to insure between the army and civil authorities coordinate action relative to sanitation of

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the city. In this capacity the inhabited parts of the city were divided into districts, with a medical officer in charge of each. He also assumed control of the camps of refugees on the Presidio reservation and Fort Mason and in Golden Gate Park and exercised sanitary supervision over other small city parks. A hospital for contagious diseases was established April 21, at Harbor View Park, large enough to accommodate 200 patients. It was admirably situated for this work, through its water supply and laundry pavilion.

In the beginning needful medical supplies were freely issued from the General Hospital to hospitals and camps. On April 21 a medical supply depot was improvised in tentage within the grounds of the General Hospital, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brechemin, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A., who assumed charge of the work, his entire depot of medical supplies having been destroyed in the city. Medical supplies have been promptly issued by Colonel Brechemin to all authorized applicants. Vaccine virus was also freely distributed on requisition. Twenty-six dispensaries were speedily opened, where free medicines and free medical attendance were available to every applicant. The wonderful health of the city and the not unreasonable complaints of destitute doctors and druggists that such action was most injurious to them caused me to soon reduce the number to six, which were very speedily still further reduced to one, with the consent of the city authorities and of the health commission.

Except for the first week, when many slight and minor injuries were treated and delicate persons placed on the invalid list, the hospitals of San Francisco were fully able and entirely willing to treat all cases. Indeed, it may be noted, as showing that there was no absolute need of outside medical help, that, as officially reported to me, one large hospital had some sixty vacant beds and was not called upon to attend to a single patient on account of the earthquake and fire. Nevertheless, the extensive precautionary arrangements by the Medical Department, though happily not absolutely necessary, were none the less wise in view of the many instances in the past where epidemics have followed great disasters.

As soon as settled conditions obtained, it seemed best to return to army methods and control. Cooperation with the Board of Health had not proved entirely satisfactory, as it devolved responsibilities and expenses upon the army far exceeding the advantages derived from a system wherein the army could only express its opinions without means of enforcing them.


On May 13 there were 50,000 people living in more than 100 separate camps, of which 21 were under military control. The health commission was unable to care for these great and extensive problems thrust upon them, and the sanitary conditions were gradually becoming worse and worse. In many cases there was neither power, personnel, nor money to remedy even the worst conditions which were daily reported by the inspector-generals of the military division.

On May 13 official cooperation between the health commission and the army ceased by the relief of Colonel Torney. Dr. J. W. Ward, president of the health commission, was informed, with the assent of

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Mayor Schmitz, that thereafter the army would neither assume responsibility nor incur expense connected with the sanitation of the city of San Francisco, but that medical advice would be given on any particular problem, should such counsel be desired. It was further stated that the army assumed the entire control and expenses of medical and sanitary measures connected with the 21 military camps.

In reorganizing this service Army Regulations were followed, the relations of the camp surgeons and commanding officers to be identical with those obtaining at military posts. Colonel Torney remained as chief sanitary officer until May 23, on which date, with the consent of General Funston, the duties devolved upon Col. C. L. Heizmann, who succeeded Colonel Torney as chief surgeon, Department of California. Colonel Heizmann's extended experience and professional knowledge were freely placed at my disposal. To as great an extent as was practicable, his recommendations were followed, though, owing to the scarcity of officers in the Medical Department, I reduced the requisition for additional surgeons of the Army from 25 to 10, depending on the local profession in case of an emergency.

The most rigid supervision was exercised over military camps in which there were at different times 20,000 refugees, and a close eye was had on 25,000 scattered campers not under our supervision, and the 5,000 in temporary shacks. In addition to rigid daily inspections by the surgeons and commanders the camps were often visited by the officer in general charge of camps and his chief surgeon. The division inspectors kept close watch on the outside private camps. Careful attention was given to limiting fly infection by screening the kitchens and insisting on the use of gauze over all cooked food. Reed troughs were added in every camp, and in the larger camps odorless excavating machines were utilized. Facilities for washing, for bathing, and for laundry work were furnished as far as practicable. The tents were floored and daily ventilation and the exposure of the interior of the tents to sunlight were insisted upon. Provisions were made for the prompt transfer of all serious cases of sickness to selected hospitals so that the attention of the camp surgeons could be given almost exclusively to sanitary and precautionary measures. The daily report showed an average sickness of less than 3 per cent.

Whenever a case of typhoid fever occurred in or near any one of the military camps the utmost care was used to thoroughly disinfect everything connected with it. As typhoid cases were almost entirely contracted outside of military camps, instant and suitable action was urged on the municipal authorities. Later, samples of water in common use were collected weekly and cultures made therefrom to determine its potable safeness. Every resident of a camp who would consent was vaccinated. As to those refusing, it seemed best under the condition of the public mind to defer compulsory vaccination until smallpox should break out in some camp, which it did not. The cooperation of the health department and of every hospital in the city was secured relative to typhoid fever cases, and a daily report thereon was made. Every case was traced to the point of its original infection, and these were charted on a map of the city. While the cases were sporadic, yet when two or three developed in the same general neighborhood the sanitary conditions of the district

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were carefully examined by division inspectors. Steps were then taken to enforce suitable sanitary regulations and to removing the campers through the medium of the Mayor, the health department, and the police.

Asst. Surg. J. R. Devereux, in charge of the medical data at these headquarters, reported, in part, on the conditions from April 18 to June 23, as follows:

We have an account of 99 cases of typhoid fever—of these, 4 cases occurred prior to April 18; of the 95 remaining cases, 30 originated in April, 55 in May, and 10 in June. Of these 95 cases there are remaining 49, either in hospitals or in private houses, 17 have died, and 33 have been discharged as cured. Of the 49 cases remaining, there are 4 in the United States General Hospital that are, to all intents and purposes, cured cases, so that we have practically but 45 cases of typhoid fever remaining in the city. Of the total number of cases reported only 5 were derived from permanent military camps whose residence was sufficiently long to have made their infection possible at these camps. * * *

Of the smallpox cases, there were admitted in the Smallpox Hospital in the month of April, 74 cases, with 9 deaths; in the month of May, 41 cases, with 2 deaths, and in the month of June 8 new cases and no deaths, and there are 25 cases remaining in hospital. The total number of cases, therefore, is 123, with 11 deaths. There have been, approximately, in the permanent camps, 15,000 people (as an average) and only one case has originated in a camp under our control.

It is too much to assume that this wonderful record of freedom from infectious disease among a population of 50,000 persons living in camps has been due to methods followed or precautions taken. It is, however, reasonable to assume that the above precautions, along the lines recommended by medical officers of the Army, served as preventives against the development of sporadic cases into an epidemic.


The question of providing temporary shelter for the 200,000 homeless people who remained in San Francisco was facilitated by the mildness of the climate, the abundance of canvas, and the considerable numbers of convenient squares and public grounds. Three thousand tents were promptly available at the Presidio, and large numbers were later received. In every convenient spot outside of the burned district there speedily sprang up tent cities and temporary barracks, into which the destitute crowded as fast as they could be erected. Although the unburned houses were thrown open with the greatest freedom and generosity to stranger and friend alike, yet a week passed before the entire community was sheltered. In several places barracks of considerable extent were speedily erected. Those in Golden Gate Park and the Speedway were provided with excellent sanitary arrangements for sewage and refuse.

As early as May 1 I urged the extreme importance of constructing on public grounds additional temporary buildings for at least 10,000 people, but such action was not favorably considered by the relief authorities. The conditions under which lived many, outside of the army camps, were often insanitary, and it was speedily evident that concentration into large camps under military supervision would best insure the public health. Although recommending this scheme to the

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Mayor, it was with the distinct announcement that the army would use neither moral stress nor physical force, relying upon the attractiveness of properly constructed, well-policed, and orderly camps against others of heterogeneous character.

The system of permanent military camps was reorganized and defined by General Orders, No. 29, of May 13, under which 21 (18 in San Francisco) of the so-called permanent camps were eventually established under army control. In charge of this work was originally placed Lieut. Col. R. K. Evans, who was known as the commander of permanent camps. There were also detailed as assistants eight of the especially detached officers, besides the 1st Squadron of the 1st Cavalry, under Major Gaston, and Companies B, D, E, and F, of the 10th Infantry. This camp system was made an independent command, and the commanding officer of each camp was entirely responsible for discipline, the sanitation, and for the execution of all orders and regulations. In short, each camp was considered an independent military post. In addition to a chief surgeon for all the camps, a medical officer of the Army was assigned to each camp with suitable medical assistants in the way of enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, and with civilian physicians on the ratio of one doctor to each 700 persons. Upon the relief of Colonel Evans, on May 31, the command of these camps passed to Maj. Joseph A. Gaston, 1st Cavalry, under whose supervision they were brought to a high degree of perfection.

Entire responsibility for the sanitation was assumed by the division commander, the chief sanitary officer being responsible for the assignment of suitable medical officers for the efficient control of sanitary matters. They were particularly charged to devote their entire energies to the work of thorough sanitation, and proper arrangements were made for the removal of garbage and all other refuse. In addition to the inspection of the camp restaurants by the camp surgeon, there was eventually detailed a medical officer of the Army whose business it was to see especially that these restaurants were maintained in the best condition, sanitary and otherwise, consistent with the surroundings. As to the inmates of these camps, there were no restrictions on personal conduct or liberty save for three purposes—those of decency, order, and cleanliness. Unless occupants were willing to conform to those three simple rules they were obliged to forego the benefits of Government canvas, Government bedding, and relief stores. The camps are made attractive by first assuring order, cleanliness, and also by giving the occupants for a time coffee and sugar in addition to the three components to the ration issued elsewhere, namely, bread, potatoes, and meat. Gradually methods of general messing were introduced which had a tendency to cause those with money or credit to purchase their food and rely upon the Government only for shelter and bedding. At each camp was stationed a small guard to insure order and enforce the simple regulations formulated for the conduct of the occupants.

The Red Cross was asked to station at each camp a competent agent to look after the registration of the occupants, investigate cases of fraud or imposture, issue clothing, and determine the special needs of the applicants, particularly of those who could be placed on a self-supporting basis. This agent was to be an understudy to the officer

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in charge, with a view of the transfer of the camp to this agent as soon as conditions were such as to justify the Red Cross in assuming this duty. Necessarily the camp population was a shifting one, and while the maximum number was 22,617, it is estimated that not less than 25,000 persons availed themselves of these camps while under military control.

It is gratifying to note that the interest of the regular officers in these camps and their occupants was not merely professional and perfunctory, but they exhibited a special desire to look after the moral and mental welfare of the occupants, as well as to provide for their physical wants. In more than one camp arrangements were made to open school for children, with a view of guarding them against the lowering tendencies of camp life. It was astonishing to note how much was accomplished by the intelligent application of army methods by the intelligent and zealous commanders, who labored unceasingly to bring their camps to the high standard of the Regular Army. Sanitary regulations were rigidly observed, good order enforced, the few turbulent and intemperate being promptly ejected. The scavenger service was good and infectious diseases almost absolutely absent, the cases requiring slight medical care rarely exceeded 2 per cent. The latrines were of the most modern character and the kitchens fly-screened. Water was furnished in abundance, and, wherever practicable, not only for drinking, but for washing, bathing, and laundry service. The potable condition of the water supply and of each camp was determined weekly by means of cultures, developed in the General Hospital. Complaints as to food were few, but they were promptly investigated, and the restaurant system was made as satisfactory as could be expected. The furnishing of clothing and the service of rehabilitation was carried out by the Red Cross and not by the army. Some have considered that a not unimportant factor in the preservation of public health was the clean, orderly, and systematic life which was necessarily lead by the occupants of these camps. In any event they admirably contributed to the comfort of the homeless people of San Francisco.


Work relative thereto was assigned to Maj. C. R. Krauthoff, depot commissary, whose duties were so satisfactorily and promptly performed that every demand upon the Subsistence Department has been immediately met, despite most adverse conditions. Major Krauthoff's untiring energy, personal supervision, and professional knowledge contributed largely to the great success of this work, in which he was aided by 14 efficient assistants.

On April 18 the general commissary depot, all its stores, and its records were destroyed by fire. Major Krauthoff, by the morning of April 19, had established a temporary depot at the Presidio, where action was immediately taken to issue such food as could be spared from the Presidio of San Francisco, Fort Mason, and Fort Miley. To meet the universal destitution the bakery at the Presidio was pushed to its utmost extent, and the hungry, exhausted refugees were fed with bread and coffee. All available food supplies in possession of the Subsistence Department in San Francisco were promptly hauled

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to the reservations where refugees had assembled and distributed to every hungry applicant. The work of gathering such food was continued until the men were driven from the subsistence warehouses by the fire.

The first volunteer relief food reached the city on the morning of April 20. Nine hundred thousand army rations, purchased by the War Department at Vancouver Barracks, Seattle, and Los Angeles, proved to be well-balanced and satisfactory. The officers and men worked night and day, especially in efforts to secure sufficient bread and fresh meat. These important components of the ration were furnished with great difficulty, considering that not a bakery in San Francisco remained with machine power, and that special arrangements had to be made for the slaughtering of cattle.

In the operations of the Citizens' Relief Committee no attempt was made to issue rations, but large wagonloads of assorted supplies were sent out to distributing stations. When the army assumed control issues were made on the basis of a fixed relief ration of suitable nutritive value, the components in many cases being necessarily substitutes from the great variety of supplies. These supplies were housed at suitable points, while issuing depots were organized with the capacity of receiving and issuing daily with dispatch 400,000 rations. The magnitude of this work is shown by the fact that the average daily issues from April 30 to May 12 exceeded 250,000 relief rations. Major Krauthoff had also to care for the potatoes and other perishable vegetables, of which more than 200,000 sacks were in store at one time. Under Major Krauthoff's supervision there was established, in addition to his ordinary depots, one for special supplies, under Capt. J. N. Kilian, in the Moulder schoolhouse, this being one of the nine depots and subdepots established for this work. The details connected with this part of the work of the Subsistence Department is noted under the following head:

Special diet issues.—In connection with this work, the value of well-trained subsistence officers, such as are found in the Army, was strikingly instanced. The importance of proper methods of receipt, storage, delivery, and care of food supplies was most evident in connection with the stores for special diet. Special provision was made from the first (General Orders, No. 18, Pacific Division, paragraph IX, April 29, 1906) for the proper nourishment of the sick, invalids, and particularly small children and nursing women. That such consideration might be generally and promptly shown, provisions were made for issues on the certificate of a physician or in the discretion of the chairman of the relief section. In order to facilitate the special diet issues to the sick in hospitals and to others, a separate depot was established in the Moulder School, Page and Gough streets, which was most systematically and satisfactorily conducted by Capt. J. N. Kilian, commissary. By the use of specially constructed refrigerators, fresh meat, milk, butter, and other like articles were kept protected from the flies, heat, and other deleterious influences, so that the issues from this depot were always in first-class condition. If there were any instances of suffering for lack of suitable diet, it was not for lack of care and preparation on the part of the army, but must have been incidental cases which might easily arise among such great numbers of destitutes.

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